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COMMENTS
BILLS AND NOTES- STATUTORY LIMITATION ON BANK'S
COMMON LAW LIABILITY RESPECTING
FORGED INDORSEMENTS
The desire for uniformity and certainty in the law as it relates to
commercial paper led to-the drafting of the Uniform Negotiable In-
struments Act and its subsequent recommendation to the legislatures
of the several states for adoption in 1896.1 It is now in force in all of
the states and territories of* the United States and in the District of
Columbia. Although generally the act has been preserved in its original
form and content, various states have from time to time enacted modi-
fications and additions. Wisconsin's most recent turn in that direction
occurred April 30, 1947, when Chapter 80 of the Laws of Wisconsin
was published creating Section 116.285 of the Wisconsin Statutes
which reads as follows:
'116.285 Bank; Forged Indorsements; Limitation. No bank
shall be liable to a depositor for the payment by it of a check
bearing a forged indorsement unless, within 2 years after the
return to the depositor of the voucher for such payment, such
depositor shall notify the bank that the check so paid bore such
forged or unauthorized indorsement."2
It is to be observed at the outset that the statute purports to deal with
forged or unauthorized indorsements only. It is silent as to the de-
positor's duty to his bank with respect to altered items, raised amounts,
etc., and it imposes a duty upon the drawer of a check to inform the
drawee bank of a forgery of a signature the genuineness of which in
all likelihood he does not know and cannot reasonably be expected to
know.
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act generally has attempted
to codify the law merchant, the rules of which were evolved by ju-
dicial decisions. The common law has developed land-mark principles
relating to the duty owed by a depositor to his bank and the duty owed
the customer by the bank. As a general proposition it is the duty of
the bank to determine the identity of the payee and to pay a check
only to whom the depositor directs such payment, and if the bank pays
contrary to the genuine order of the drawer, it cannot charge his ac-
count.
"The holder of a check must bring himself within the order con-
tained in the check. If the check was originally payable to order
and not to bearer, the holder will be unable so to bring himself if
one of the indorsements under which he must derive his title has
I For a succint declaration of the primary purpose of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act see State Bank of Halstad v. Bilstad, 162 Iowa 433, 136
N.W. 204 (1912).
2 Laws of Wisconsin, No. 23-A, Chapter 80; approved April 29, 1947; published
April 30, 1947.
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been forged. Therefore he is not the person authorized to re-
ceive payment of the check. A payment made to such a holder
will not be an authorized payment, and a bank paying a check to
such a holder, even though it has not been negligent in not dis-
covering the fact of the forgery, cannot charge the drawer's ac-
count. The risk arising from forged indorsements is thus thrown
upon the bank and not upon the drawer."'3
Also as between the drawer and the drawee bank the latter is bound
at its peril to ascertain the genuineness of indorsements upon which
a check is paid. A bank impliedly contracts with its depositor to pay
the latter's checks from his deposits to the person to whom he
orders payment, and not to pay checks upon the forged indorsement of
the payee's name.4 It has been held that the drawee bank should with-
hold payment until fully satisfied as to the genuineness of the indorse-
ment.5 Nor does the genuineness of the last indorsement relieve the
bank from looking to the genuineness of preceding indorsements. 6 The
conclusion is inescapable that, generally, when a. banker pays a forged
check, he is bound to pay again to his depositor because he paid in the
first instance without authority.
The foregoing, of course, assumes lack of negligence and absence
of fault on the part of the depositor. If it be the fault of the depositor
that the banker pays when he should not or pays more than the drawer
orders paid, the banker should not be called upon to pay again.7 What
constitutes such negligence depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each particular case. The drawer of a check may leave a signed
blank check in the custody of one not ordinarily expected to have good
business judgment, and as a result a third party may seize upon such
a situation to raise the amount of the check.8 One may be found negli-
gent by a jury if he so draws a check that items may be inserted with-
out exciting suspicion.9 Where one draws an instrument in pencil
rather than by the use of pen and ink, he may be found negligent, al-
though it is true that the mere writing of an instrument in pencil can-
not, of itself, be said to be negligence since the law recognizes the valid-
ity of such instruments equally with those written with ink or printed.0
Professor Williston indicates, however, that negligence on the part of
3 Williston, "Negotiable Instruments," published by the American Institute of
Banking, 1931, p. 235.
4New York Title and Mortgage Co. v. First National Bank of Kansas City,
51 F. (2d) 485, 77 A.L.R. 1053 (1931).
5 Armstrong v. Pomeroy National Bank, 46 Ohio 512, 22 N.E. 866, 6 L.R.A.
625 (1889).
6 Atlanta National Bank v. Burke, 81 Ga. 597, 7 S.E. 738, 2 L.R.A. 96 (1888);
see also Life Insurance Company of Virginia v. Edisto National Bank of
Orangeburg, 16 S.C. 505, 165 S.E. 178 (1932).7 Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, Common Pleas (1827).
8 Ibid.
9 Timbel v. Garfield National Bank, 121 App. Div. 870, 106 N.Y.S. 497 (1907).
10 Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52 P. 115, 15 A.L.R. 146 (1898).
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the drawer is rarely, if ever, responsible for a forged indorsement or
a forged check. Discussing the drawer's duty to care for his check
book, he points out that even though a depositor has carelessly left his
check book lying around his office, accessible to any one of his staff,
and a blank is stolen, forged, and paid by the drawee bank, this does
not seem to be such negligence on the part of the depositor as to charge
him with responsibility. He may still insist that the bank must not
charge his account with the forged checkn The law is reluctant to fix
responsibility upon one antecedent to a conscious wrongdoer.
At any rate, it seems well established that while a bank cannot
charge the drawer's account for the amount of a check bearinj a forged
indorsement, the bank, under some circumstances, can seek protection
in the drawer's negligent or other conduct of such nature as to create
an estoppel against him. Moreover, it is equally clear that the duty of a
depositor includes examination of his statement of account and can-
celled checks and reporting within a reasonable time any errors, because
the bank legally may regard continued silence as an admission that the
entries shown are correct." The drawer may, by such silence and fail-
ure to be alert, create an estoppel against himself. However, the re-
luctance with which some courts have applied this doctrine is shown
by the attitude of the Supreme Court of Minnesota when it stated that
when a bank returns a check to a depositor, the depositor has the right
to assume that the bank has ascertained the genuineness of indorse-
ments.13 It is to be remembered in this connection, of course, that any
negligence on the part of the drawer is immaterial unless it is a proxi-
mate cause of the bank's conduct in paying before discovery of error.
At this point it may be well to point out that the cases which give
the bank a defense upon the basis of the depositor's negligence do so in
a wide variety of fact situations, covering a broad range of negligent
conduct possible in the handling of checks. This raises the question as
to the effect of Section 116.285 on the common law defense of the bank.
Normally, where a statute is clear, it controls, and former adjudications
in the jurisdiction yield to the legislative enactment ;14 but where the
statute is silent, resort must be had to the law merchant or to the com-
mon law regulating commercial paper.1 5 What then is the effect of this
statute on a situation not expressly covered by it where the drawer, by
his negligent conduct, would be estopped from asserting his right
11 Williston, "Negotiable Instruments," p. 237.
12 First National Bank of Philadelphia v. M. Walter Farrell, 272 Fed. 371, 16
A.L.R. 651 (1921).
13 City of St. Paul v. Merchant's National Bank, 151 Minn. 485, 187 N.W. 516,
22 A.L.R. 1221 (1922).
14 First National Bank v. Miller, 139 Wis. 136, 120 N.W. 820 (1909).
'
5 Mechanic's and Farmer's Savings Bank v. Katterjohn, 137 Ky. 427, 125 S.W.
1071 (1910).
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against the bank for paying a check bearing a forged indorsement?
Does the statute wipe out this defense? Unquestionably the statute
does not destroy defenses available to the bank when the depositor's
negligence consists in carelessly drawing a check, or in other respects
heretofore discussed. Nor does it seem reasonable to conclude that be-
cause the legislature has spoken as to the matter of forged indorsements
and has given the banks of the state immunity from liability after the
expiration of a two year period, depositors are thereby relieved of their
responsibility of acting reasonably and prudently within that two year
period. As a matter of fact, the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act
itself provides that in any case not provided for by the act the rules
of the law merchant shall govern.' 6 Wisconsin's statutory provision is
similar.17
Section 116.285 makes it the duty of a drawer of a check to inform
the drawee bank of a forged indorsement within two years after the
return to him of the voucher for such payment in order to hold the
bank for the amount of any check paid under such forged indorsement. s
By the force of this statute one who draws a check must investigate,
ascertain, and be aware of the signatures of all whom he makes payees
of checks he draws and of all subsequent indorsers. The practical diffi-
culty to the drawer of such a burden was recognized by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in St. Paul v. Merchant's National Bank when it said:
"The bank's obligation is to pay the checks only upon a genuine
indorsement. The drawer is not presumed to know, and in fact
seldom does know, the signature of the payee. The bank must,
at its own peril, determine that question. It has the opportunity,
by requiring identification when the check is presented of
ascertaining whether the indorsement is genuine or not."'19
In the ordinary course of business dealings where checks are involved
and are given in payment of debts or other current obligations, probably
no problem will arise. One who pays his grocery bill by a check which
falls into the hands of a forger, will without doubt be informed by his
creditor within two years that the account has not been paid. The likeli-
hood of his being promptly informed is less, however, if the payee's in-
dorsement is genuine and a subsequent indorsement is forged. In the or-
dinary case probably no hardship will result to the depositor. But it is
the out-of-the-ordinary case that makes hard law. If the customer is
to be charged with negligence, it is submitted it should not be on the
16 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Title IV, Art. I, Sec. 196: "In any
case not provided for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern."
17 Wisconsin Statutes, Section 116.01: "In any case not provided for in this
chapter the rules of the law merchant shall govern."
'sSupra, note 2.
19 Supra, note 13.
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arbitrary basis provided by this statute, but rather according to the well-
tested, flexible principles developed in the common law.
Nor does the Wisconsin statute under consideration here seem to be
as complete as it might be. If it was the intention of the legislature to
provide relief by way of a statute of limitations from what is admitted-
ly a difficult burden on a bank, it does not seem reasonable to omit from
the law matters equally as important as forged indorsements. The
statute ignores identical problems arising from material alterations and
raised amounts. The Texas legislature enacted a similar statute in 1943;
and while it is subject to some of the objections made to S e c t i o n
116.285, it does appear to deal more comprehensively with the problem.
It provides:
"A bank may notify a depositor by mail at his address as reflec-
ted by the records of the bank to call for cancelled items charged
to his account, or may mail such cancelled items to the depositor
at such address. No depositor shall be permitted to dispute any
charge to his account on the ground that the same is based upon
a forged, unauthorized, raised or altered item,2 0 unless within
one (1) year from the time the check was paid, he shall notify
the bank in writing that the item in question is forged, unauthor-
ized, raised or altered."-"
No Texas case, to the time of this writing, has interpreted the fore-
going statute, but a United States District Court considered it in Uni-
ted States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Beall.2 There the de-
fendant, an employee of a pipeline company, had charge of writing
checks. Because of his peculiar knowledge of the inactivity of certain
oil leases he was able to write checks payable to these customers, forge
their indorsements, and secure funds for his own use without the
knowledge of his employer. When the forgeries were discovered after
passing through the hands of several indorsers, the plaintiff surety com-
pany paid the pipeline company, took an assignment of the latter's rights
of action, and sued the employee and the drawee bank. The bank called
attention to the Texas statute, and since more than the statutory period
of one year had expired, the bank prevailed. It does not appear from
the opinion whether the pipeline company had actual knowledge of
these forgeries, but it is entirely conceivable that under similar circum-
stances such a depositor would not reasonably discover such forgeries
within a year. In that regard the Texas statute is open to the same
criticism as Section 116.285. In other respects it at least is more com-
plete than the newly-enacted Wisconsin law.
20 Italics, the writer's.2 1 Art, 342-711, Act 1943, 48th Legislature of Texas, p. 154, ch. 97, sub-ch. VII,
art 11, Vernon's Ann Civ. St., art. 342-711.
22United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Beall, 73 F. Supp. 977 (1947).
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It has been the purpose of this comment to point out first, that such
simplicity and certainty as can be achieved through codification of the
law are always at the expense of desired flexibility; second, that the
knowledge of the payee's or indorsers' signatures demanded by this
statute is not within the usual scope of what a drawer of a check can
reasonably be expected to know (such knowledge is necessary if 116.-
285 is to operate without real hardship) ; and third, the new Wisconsin
statute might have been drafted with an eye to cover more completely
the more common causes of mistaken bank payments, of which the
forged indorsement is but one.
KYLE MONTAGUE
